Adolf Hitler’s views on Abrahamic religions

Adolf Hitler, August 28, 1942: 

“Had Charles Martel not been victorious at Poitiers -already, you see, the world had already fallen into the hands of the Jews, so gutless a thing Christianity! -then we should in all probability have been converted to Mohammedanism (Islam), that cult which glorifies the heroism and which opens up the seventh Heaven to the bold warrior alone. Then the Germanic races would have conquered the world. Christianity alone prevented them from doing so.”

Arab Awakening is Israel’s nightmare

Lets take a look back at 2011. Tunisia ignited the Arab Spring by the flaming BouAziza. It ushered a new phase in Arab politics which the dictators had not taken into account, ie the rise of a new generation of angry youths able to dislodge the strngmans’ tin soldiers by their united sounds of freedom. The fall of Tunisia sparked Egyptians to mobilise at Tahrir Square demanding the end of Hosni Mubarak. Right at that time, what could have been happening in Washington and Tel Aviv is of great importance today, especially knowing now that the generals basically threw in a coup in the midst of presidential elections.

Cairo being the most important piece in the Arab Israeli conflict occupies central position in Washington’s foreign policy for the Middle East. US strategy for the greater Arab world is in many ways a reflection of how Cairo is managed by the US with regard to its peace treaty with Israel. A hostile government in Cairo will be ideally placed to motivate all other Arab states to shape an anti Israeli stance politically, diplomatically and militarily. An Israel friendly government will achieve Mubarak’s feat to the satisfaction of US, EU, Arab dictators (monarchs) and puppet rulers (as in Maliki, Karzai and Zardari).

The revolution in 2011 carried a mix signal for the world. Was the revolution going to bring an Israel  hostile administration or a Mubarak type? For the freedom loving muslims this was the watershed in their history. The ouster of a dictator would usher in a new era of liberty and justice, after almost a century of trials and failures with western secular political concepts. The western world could not share those sentiments exactly with the mass muslims. The fear was that Mubarak’s departure could bring in a democratically elected Islamist party, the Muslim Brotherhood to power by defeating the secularist parties in a free and fair general election, was never going to go down easily with the secular western world.

Democracy, if allowed to function properly in Egypt, may become the very poison which could destroy the existing strategy of the Israeli-US lobby for the region. In the wake of massive public protests at Tahrir Square what options were left for Washington except to come out in support of a “smooth transition”, as much as they hated to see the fall of their most important ally in the region after Israel.

It was not surprising that the champion of global democracy could not seize the moment to support the revolutionaries in their struggle for liberty against a ruthless dictator. The fall of Mubarak was seen by many as the fall of the US-Egypt unholy alliance of 3 decades. Israel for her part has always cautioned the world that Arabs and Muslims in general are unworthy of being under any rule of law. They deserve to be bludgeoned by dictators like Mubarak and Assad, for their own good. Left under democracy Arab muslims could be the worst nightmare for Israel and the west.

Israel has quite satisfactorily convinced the world that Arab dictators are equivalent of donkeys. They have no guts to stand up to Israel when Palestinians are butchered by tanks manufactured with the help of  cheap oil from the Gulf. Israel receives subsidized gas for power generation from Egypt while Gazza is blacked out at will. But then, this, Israel says, is perfect for the Arabs. A truly representative government in the Arab world is not in the best interest of Israel and her allies. They know that Arab street is filled with “hate Israel” sentiment and that is probably why Israel managed for so long to collectively punish the common Arabs by mobilising international support for criminals like Assad, Ghaddafi and Mubarak.

Back in February 2011, an Israeli think tank wrote the following on its website:

“With liberation movements storming throughout the Middle East, including countries like Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and others, we could be witnessing a new regional alignment; one without extreme tensions that previously existed between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. No, we are not saying that there will be a new notion of utopia between these groups. What we are saying is that should these tensions subside and more palatable relations occur then it is very likely that friendlier more cooperative relationships could develop for other issues such as a unified focus on Israel.  In other words, hatred towards Israel could replace the religious fears and tensions that previously existed. Hatred of Israel could become the single unifying issue that Muslim and Arab nations might rally around in order to further their interests in the development of an Islamic Caliphate or for any other political interests whose success would require a unification of Islamic nations.”

Israel sees the Arab awakening in ways more than one. We must give credit to the zionist regime for being visionary. They are predicting, quite rightly, the future of the Arab world (minus the criminals) with a modified map of the region altogether. Will the Arabs wake up and smell the hummus…

Geopolitics of Syria

Photography by World of

As the crisis in Syria keeps escalating and the violent crackdown of the Bashar al-Assad regime results in more civilian deaths, the growing instability and civil opposition is significantly challenging the die-hard regime and raises questions regarding how much longer it can keep up with the deteriorating domestic situation and the increasing international pressure. More importantly, the troubling question that emerges is what might happen when the regime is finally overthrown?

While people in Syria and the West want a major change to take place in the country, the same cannot be said for some of the other states of the Middle East. Even if western countries want al-Assad to step down they will not intervene in Syria as easily as they did in Libya because this time there is much more at stake since Syria is geographically and geopolitically located at the heart of the Middle East and all of its problems. One need only look at a map of Syria and observe the countries with which it shares a border (Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel) to recognize this.

Syria also has political and strategic ties with actors that are hostile to the West such as Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Paradoxically, during the last decade or so Damascus has been maintaining good relationships with Turkey, a mostly western ally, as well. Nonetheless, for the last few months Turkey has been pressuring Assad to stop the violent crackdown and step down. This shift in Ankara’s behavior towards Syria was a concern for other states in the region like Iran – for various reasons which are examined below. From that perspective it seems that if the regime in Syria were to be overthrown and replaced with a pro-western one, the allies of the present Syrian regime could react in unpredictable ways out of fear, possibly disturbing the regional geopolitical realities and even the balance of power.

Iran is already worried because of Turkey’s stance towards the Syrian crisis. During the last decade the good relations between Syria and Turkey, the Kurdish problem that both states face and the “zero problems with neighbors” doctrine of Turkish foreign policy, have brought Iran and Turkey closer to each other. Yet their good relations, in the context of their competition for regional hegemony and their traditional enmity, can still be questioned. For Iran in particular, the commercial and economic bonds that were developed between itself and Turkey were of vital significance since they constituted a way out of the western embargo (which was mainly imposed to counter its nuclear policies) and give impetus to its development aims. Furthermore, Turkey was a key ally for Iran to have given the always tense situation between Tehran and Tel Aviv and the fact that Turkey’s relations with Israel have been in decline for the last three years. On the other hand, Turkey used its cooperation with Iran to attain more stability in the transnational Kurdish territories, for economic reasons and of course to approach the Arab-Muslim world including the Palestinians. The increasingly strained relations between Turkey and Israel and the development of better relations between Turkey, Syria and Iran have increased Ankara’s prominence among the Arab countries while creating tensions within the western-Israel alliance.

If the Syrian regime were to be replaced with a pro-western one, a number of things could happen. Iran might turn against the new Syrian regime and Turkey for supporting the change while Turkey would probably lose the support of Lebanon, Palestine and probably of other Middle East countries as well. The instability or even sectarian conflicts that could possibly emerge in Syria would create the necessary conditions for the Kurds to intensify their efforts for autonomy thus creating instability and conflicts in Northern Iraq, Turkey and Iran as well. These, in turn, could lead Israel to adopt a harder stance towards Iran and therefore force the US to undertake a more active role in backing it. Within this context Turkey’s developing solidarity with the Arab-Muslim world could fall apart and the doctrine of “zero problems” would face a setback. Hence Ankara would once again have to rely on its traditional western allies, which it has been largely neglecting of late. This, of course, would depend on Turkey’s ability to strike a balance between its old friends and its new potential enemies, especially now that it would have to face the great Iranian threat.

The above scenario may not come to fruition, yet it is far from implausible. Such a scenario would create new regional and international alliances thereby changing the current order and balance of power in the Middle East. The possibility alone of such a development indicates both the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Syria and the reasons why the international community finds it more difficult to intervene there than it did in Libya. Even as the humanitarian crisis that is taking place there worsens, and evidence of genocide emerges, the Syrian crisis is far more complicated than the Libyan one and should consequently be handled with caution by the international community.

Author: Zenonas Tziarras

Why Putin supports Assad

Since Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad has at least one ally on the UN Security Council: Russia, an ally adamant in its opposition to sanctions against Damascus.

According to BBC, many analysts believe this stance brings little benefit to Russia, and is more a product of domestic considerations and psychological complexes of the Kremlin’s ruling elite.

Last October, Russia and China used their veto to stop a UN resolution that condemned the government of Mr Assad for the suppression of anti-government protests.

Now, Moscow has once again threatened to wield its veto, demanding changes to the latest text.

While Moscow does not wholly support the actions of the Syrian government, it opposes sanctions and has repeatedly stressed its opposition to even the slightest hint of external intervention along the lines of the Libya.

The Kremlin is also against the call for President Assad’s resignation and insists that the blame for the crisis in the country and the death of some 5,500 civilians cannot be attributed to the Syrian authorities alone.

The draft resolution does not mention any possible military action against Syria. But Russia wants to delete from it a call for Bashar al-Assad to hand over power to his deputy and a proposal to ban the sale of arms to Syria. Russia is a key weapons supplier for Damascus.

Moscow’s most desirable outcome would appear to be saving President Assad, who would then implement some reforms.

On January 30, Russia’s foreign ministry once again called for talks between the Syrian authorities and the opposition and suggested Moscow as a venue. While Russia insists on talks “without preconditions”, the Syrian opposition demands a ceasefire and an end to repression by government forces.

Of particular concern for the West is the continuing delivery of Russian arms to Syria. According to some estimates, some 10% of Russia’s global arms sales go to Syria, with current contracts estimated to be worth $1.5bn (£950m).

Moscow argues that it has not signed up to Western sanctions and has contracts with Damascus which must be honoured.

Western observers generally see the situation in terms of geopolitical pragmatism: Syria is Russia’s long-time ally in the Middle East, and Russia maintains a naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus.

But Russia’s pragmatism is now being called into question.

It sends a simple and clear message to the population – we are strong, we are not afraid of anybody”

Over the past 15 years the same scenario has been played out three times in different countries.

Although with some reservations, Moscow supported first Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, then Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and more recently Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, even though it had no means to translate that support into action, and even though the Kremlin did not want seriously to undermine its relations with the US and Europe.

The West achieved its aims in each case, while Russia appeared impotent and suffered political and economic losses.

“Russia is constantly losing allies. With the exception of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Venezuela, there are practically no countries that may be called our friends,” political analyst Alexei Vorobyov told the BBC.

So why are the Kremlin and foreign ministry following the same path again? “Although Putin likes the European way, he sees many parallels between himself and Assad,” says the former head of Russia’s National Strategy Institute, Stanislav Belkovsky. “It is a question of personal sympathy, and a feeling of possibly sharing the same fate.”

Some observers, especially from the opposition camp, are keen to suggest that Putin is mindful of the fate of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi, fearing that he might be next. But others find such parallels too far-fetched. It is difficult to imagine a civil war or military intervention in a nuclear state like Russia. Alexei Vorobyov has no doubt that the Kremlin’s foreign policy is largely addressed to a domestic audience.

“It’s not a struggle for Syria or Iran, it is a struggle against the West. Of course, it is just a pretend struggle. But it sends a simple and clear message to the population – we are strong, we are not afraid of anybody.”

Among those who shape Russian foreign policy, there is a widespread belief that if Moscow sticks to its guns it will eventually gain a strategic advantage. They reason that sooner or later the West will stumble, either because of the economic crisis, or for some other reason. In these circumstances, being seen as a leader of the camp rejecting Western values could bring great dividends.